We investigate the structure of good deal bounds, which are subintervals of a no-arbitrage pricing bound, for financial market models with convex constraints as an extension of Arai and Fukasawa [2] . The upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound are naturally described by a convex risk measure. We call such a risk measure a good deal valuation; and study its properties. We also discuss superhedging cost and Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing for convex constrained markets.
Introduction
For a given contingent claim in an incomplete financial market, its price is not determined uniquely under the no-arbitrage framework. Only a pricing bound, called a no-arbitrage pricing bound, is provided. For a concrete explanation, letting L be a linear space of measurable functions representing all future cash-flows, we describe our market with M ⊂ L the set of 0-attainable claims, that is, future payoffs which investors can replicate completely with 0 initial cost. In this paper, M is assumed to be convex, but not necessarily a cone. Defining a functional on L as ρ 0 (x) := inf{r ∈ R| there exists m ∈ M such that r + m + x ≥ 0} for x ∈ L, we obtain that the superhedging cost and the no-arbitrage pricing bound for claim x are given by ρ 0 (−x) and [−ρ 0 (x), ρ 0 (−x)] respectively.
Generally speaking, the no-arbitrage pricing bound is too wide to be useful as the collection of candidate prices from a practical point of view. Thus, we focus on narrowing the interval of candidate prices. That is, excluding prices with low risk, called good deals, from the no-arbitrage pricing bound, we construct a sharper pricing bound, called a good deal bound. Whether a price is a good deal, depends on the investor's risk preference. For example, Cochrane and Saá-Requejo [9] defined a good deal bound by excluding prices with high Sharpe ratio. We do not treat any specific good deal bound in this paper. Instead, we are interested in the entire structure of good deal bounds. We regard the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound as functionals on L, denoted by a and b respectively. Thus, the interval [b(x), a(x)], which is a subinterval of [−ρ 0 (x), ρ 0 (−x)], formulates a good deal bound. As in Arai and Fukasawa [2] , defining ρ a (−x) := a(x), it is natural that ρ a becomes a convex risk measure. We call it a good deal valuation (GDV, hereafter). That is, a GDV is defined as a convex risk measure describing the upper bound of a good deal bound. Similarly, defining −ρ b (x) := b(x), we can see that ρ b is also a GDV, that is, it can describe the upper bound of a different good deal bound.
Our aim of this paper is to study GDVs for the case where M is convex along with the argument of [2] , in which they studied GDVs thoroughly when M is a convex cone. They showed that ρ 0 is a coherent risk measure; and enumerated equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV. Besides, for a given convex risk measure, they gave a set of equivalent conditions to be a GDV. In particular, they showed that ρ is a GDV if and only if it is a risk indifference price. Furthermore, they extended the Kreps-Yantype Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP, hereafter) to the equivalence between the no-free-lunch condition (NFL, hereafter) and the existence of a relevant GDV. In addition to [2] , there is much literature on good deal bounds from the point of view of risk measures, say, Bion-Nadal [5] , Bion-Nadal and Di Nunno [6] , Jaschke and Küchler [19] and Staum [33] . But, no one studied good deal bounds for markets with convex constraints, whereas such models appear frequently in mathematical finance, say, illiquid market models, models with borrowing constraints and so on. Indeed, there is much literature treating models with convex constraints: Cuoco [10] , Cvitanić and Karatzas [11] and [12] , Karatzas and Kou [20] , Larsen andŽitković [24] , Pennanen [26] and [27] , Pennanen and Penner [28] , and so forth. See also examples introduced in Subsection 2.1.
Our main contribution is threefold as follows:
1. We begin with a study for the functional ρ 0 , since it expresses the upper and lower bounds of the no-arbitrage pricing bound. As seen in [2] , ρ 0 is given as a coherent risk measure when M is a convex cone. In this case, the set Q 0 of all probability measures Q such that sup m∈M E Q [m] = 0, plays a central role to discuss not only ρ 0 but also GDVs. On the other hand, excluding the cone property from M, ρ 0 is no longer coherent in general. In this setting, we need to consider, instead of Q 0 , the set, denoted by Q, of all probability measures Q such that sup m∈M E Q [m] is finite. In particular, we investigate properties of the largest minorant of ρ 0 with the Fatou property, since it is the first candidate of GDVs.
2. We shall enumerate equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV; and introduce a set of equivalent conditions for a given convex risk measure to be a GDV. In addition, we introduce an example of a GDV which is not a risk indifference price. This shows that the structure of good deal bounds is much different from that for the case where M is a convex cone. Moreover, we give conditions for a GDV to be a risk indifference price; and for a risk indifference price to be a GDV.
3. We deal with the Kreps-Yan-type FTAP. Kreps [23] proved that, if M is a convex cone, Q 0 = ∅ is equivalent to the NFL, that is, the weak closure of M does not include any nonzero nonnegative claims. Moreover, [2] showed that the existence of a relevant GDV is equivalent to the NFL. Thus, we expect naturally that, when M is convex, the equivalence holds true among the NFL, the existence of a relevant GDV and a condition related to Q. Indeed, we shall see the equivalence between the first two conditions, but illustrate counterexamples for the last one. Some variants of FTAP for constrained models have been introduced by Carassus, Pham and Touzi [7] , Evstigneev, Schürger and Taksar [16] , [26] , Rokhlin [30] , Roux [31] and so on. Thus, our contribution is to treat FTAP comprehensively for models with convex constraints.
An outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our model; and prepare some terminologies and mathematical preliminaries. In particular, since we take an Orlicz space (or heart) as L, we introduce some terminologies on Orlicz space. We study ρ 0 in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to study properties of GDVs. FTAP will be discussed in Section 5; and conclusions are given in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we fix a complete probability space (Ω, F , P). Note that we denote by N the set of all positive integers; and by L 0 the set of all R-valued measurable functions on (Ω, F ). Moreover, for a set of measurable functions X, we denote X + (resp. X − ):= {x ∈ X|x ≥ 0 a.s. (resp. ≤)}.
We start with definitions of Young function, Orlicz heart and Orlicz space.
Definition 2.1
1. An even lower semi-continuous convex function Φ : R → R ∪ {∞} is called a Young function, if it satisfies the following:
is called Orlicz heart with Φ. In addition, a space L Φ defined as
is called Orlicz space with Φ. 
Moreover, the dual space of L Φ may include a singular part. For more details on Orlicz space, see Edgar and Sucheston [15] and Rao and Ren [29] .
Let L be either M Φ or L Φ , which is regarded as the set of all future cashflows. We denote by L * its dual space. This setting would be natural, since it covers wide classes including all L p spaces with p ∈ [1, ∞]; and fits to utility maximization problems (see Arai [1] , [2] , Biagini and Frittelli [3] and Cheridito and Li [8] ). Moreover, let M be a convex subset of L including L − . The set M expresses the set of all 0-attainable claims: future payoffs which investors can purchase without initial cost. Although M is assumed to be a convex cone in [2] , we generalize it to the convex case by excluding the cone property from M.
For later use, we prepare some notation. 
Examples for convex markets
Here we introduce some examples such that M is convex, but not a cone.
Example 2.4 (A simple illiquid market model)
We consider a one-period binomial model in which one riskless asset with zero interest rate and one risky asset are tradable. For t = 0, 1, let S t be the price of the risky asset at time t. We assume that S 0 ∈ R and S := S 1 − S 0 belongs to L. We take into account nonlinear illiquidity effects denoted by a function f : R → R. More precisely, we assume that, for any α ∈ R, it costs αS 0 + f (α) to get α units of the risky asset. It seems that f (α) describes the extra cost for purchasing α units of the risky asset. Now, suppose that f is a continuous convex function with f (0) = 0, non-increasing on (−∞, 0] and non-decreasing on [0, ∞). For example, f (α) = e |α| − 1 or f (α) = α 2 . As a result, the set of all 0-attainable claims is expressed as
which forms a convex subset of L including L − , but not necessarily a cone.
Example 2.5 (Constraints on number of shares) Consider a continuous trading model with maturity T ∈ (0, ∞). Suppose that one riskless asset with zero interest rate and d risky assets are tradable; and the price of the risky assets is described by an R d -valued locally bounded RCLL special semimartingale S defined on a complete probability space (Ω,
where F is a filtration satisfying the so-called usual condition, that is, F is right-continuous, F T = F and F 0 contains all null sets of F . Let L(S) be the set of all R d -valued S-integrable predictable processes; and G t (ϑ) := t 0 ϑ s dS s for any t ∈ [0, T] and any ϑ ∈ L(S). Note that ϑ ∈ L(S) denotes the number of shares the investor holds; and the process G(ϑ) represents the gain process induced by a self-financing strategy ϑ. Now, we impose convex constraints on the set of all admissible strategies. That is, we consider the case where the set of 0-attainable claims is given as
where K is a convex subset of R d including 0. We introduce some concrete examples of K as follows:
(Constraints on total number of shares)
For more details, see [10] , [11] and [12] .
Example 2.6 (Constraints on amount invested)
We consider the same model as the previous example; and assume that S > 0 and M is given as 
for fixed a > 0, it forms a convex set. On the other hand, when M is denoted 
Example 2.9 (Predictably convexity)
We introduce the predictably convexity, which brings us an important class of models with convex constraints. It has been undertaken by Föllmer and Kramkov [17] ; and discussed in Chapter 9 of Föllmer and Schied [18] for discrete time models. See also [1] , Klöppel and Schweizer [22] . Now, we define it as follows: A family of semimartingales S is said to be predictably convex if, for any S 1 , S 2 ∈ S and any [0, 1]-valued predictable process h, 
In addition, we denote
and G(Θ W ) := {G(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ Θ W }. Let S be a predictably convex subset of G(Θ W ), and Θ S the corresponding subset of Θ W to S. That is, we can describe S = {G(ϑ)|ϑ ∈ Θ S }. Now, we denote
which is convex.
Convex risk measure
We define convex risk measures and some related terminologies. In addition, we introduce a representation result.
2. In addition, a convex risk measure ρ is a coherent risk measure if it satisfies positive homogeneity: ρ(λx) = λρ(x) for any x ∈ L and any λ ≥ 0.
(a) If f (0) = 0, then f is said to be normalized.
We define the penalty function for f as
for g ∈ L * 1 . In particular, we denote, for Q ∈ P,
2. We denote by R the set of all normalized convex risk measures on L with the Fatou property.
Theorem 2.12 (Proposition 1 of [3])
Any ρ ∈ R is represented as
A separating result
We prepare a proposition, which will appear over and over again in the sequel. Now, we denote by
Proposition 2.13
Let B ⊂ L + be a convex set including at least one positive constant.
If B is · -compact and M s
Proof. It suffices to show only the first assertion. By the conditions, the Hahn-Banach separating theorem implies the existence of g ∈ L * satisfying (2.5). Remark that sup m∈M s g(m) ≥ 0 because 0 ∈ M. Thus, we have g(1) > 0, since B includes at least one positive constant. Without loss of generality, we may assume
holds true. In addition, Definition 2.2 implies that the LHS of (2.5) takes the value ∞ unless g ∈ L * . Thus, g belongs to L * . ✷
Superhedging cost
Superhedging cost for a claim is defined as the lowest price of the claim which enables investors to construct an arbitrage opportunity by selling the claim and selecting a suitable strategy from M. More precisely, defining a functional ρ 0 on L as
the superhedging cost for claim x is given by ρ 0 (−x); and the no-arbitrage pricing bound for x is given by [−ρ 0 (x), ρ 0 (−x)]. Note that GDVs will be defined by using ρ 0 in Section 4. Thus, we investigate properties of ρ 0 which we will need for studying GDVs.
Proof.
Since
In addition, this inequality also holds for any x ∈ L with ρ 0 (x) = ∞. Therefore, we have sup
Proof. "only if" part: Firstly, the monotonicity and cash-invariance are obvious. Next, we see ρ 0 > −∞. Assuming that there exists an x ∈ L with ρ 0 (x) = −∞, (3.1) implies that for any c > 0, we can find an m c ∈ M such that −c
for any c > 0 by Lemma 3.1, that is, g(x) = ∞. This is a contradiction, so ρ 0 is (−∞, ∞]-valued; and has the properness because ρ 0 (0) ≤ 0. Lastly, we see the convexity of ρ 0 . Fix x 1 , x 2 ∈ L and λ ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily. Now, we assume that both ρ 0 (x 1 ) and ρ 0 (x 2 ) are finite. Otherwise, the convexity holds clearly.
, from which the convexity of ρ 0 follows. "if" part: Suppose that L * = ∅. Assuming that there exists a c > 0
, which is a contradiction. As a result, any c > 0 is included in M s . Now, for any k ∈ N, we take an
Then, x n converges to x ∞ a.s.; and {x n } is a Cauchy sequence in · . Hence, Lemma 3.3 provides
Proof.
Since {x n } is a Cauchy sequence, there exists an x ′ ∞ ∈ L such that x n − x ′ ∞ → 0 by the completeness of (L, · ). In addition, Proposition 2.1.10 (6) of [15] implies that x n tends to x ′ ∞ in probability. Hence,
In the proof of Proposition 3.2, we see x ∞ ∈ L. At first glance, it seems to be shown easier as follows:
However, this is not accurate. Firstly, the former inequality is not trivial. Besides, even if
Remark 3.5 When M is a convex cone, (ρ 0 ) * takes the values 0 and ∞ only. Thus, ρ 0 is a coherent risk measure if and only if L * = ∅. For more details, see [2] .
Example 3.6 For the case where
In this case, L * is empty evidently.
Remark 3.7
We consider the concept of no arbitrage of the first kind, which is weaker than the NFL and the no-free-lunch with vanishing risk. We call z ∈ L + \{0} an arbitrage of the first kind if, for any ε > 0, we can find an m ∈ M such that ε + m − z ≥ 0. For more details on arbitrage of the first kind, see Kardaras [21] . We can see immediately that, for z ∈ L + \{0}, it is an arbitrage of the first kind if and only if ρ 0 (−z) = 0. In other words, there is no arbitrage of the first kind if and only if ρ 0 is relevant. Now, we define a functional ρ 0 , which is closely related to superhedging cost, as follows:
Note that (ρ 0 ) * (Q) is defined in (2.4). We introduce a proposition, some lemmas and examples related to ρ 0 .
Proposition 3.8
The following are equivalent: 
ϑ k = 0 except for finitely many ks − L + .
Since P ∈ Q, ρ 0 has the Fatou property by Proposition 3.8. On the other hand, letting x n := ∑ n k=1 1 {ω k } for n ∈ N, we have ρ 0 (−x n ) = 0 for any n ∈ N, although ρ 0 (−1) = 1 and x n tends to 1. Thus, ρ 0 does not possess the Fatou property. Another example in which ρ 0 = ρ 0 holds has been introduced in [2] .
Lemma 3.10
The following are equivalent:
Proof.
1⇒2: Proposition 3.8 yields that ρ 0 ≤ ρ 0 . The convexity of ρ 0 implies that 
Remark 3.12 Condition 1 in Lemma 3.10 is equivalent to Q 0 = ∅ when M is a convex cone. Actually, it will play a similar role to "Q 0 = ∅" in the convex cone case as in [2] . Example 3.13 By Lemma 3.10, ρ 0 (0) = 0 whenever ρ 0 (0) = 0, while its reverse implication does not hold. We reconsider Example 3.9. Now, we assume ρ 0 (0) < 0. Letting r = −ρ 0 (0) that m ≥ r, which means m(ω k ) ≥ r for any k ∈ N. This is a contradiction. As a result, ρ 0 (0) = 0. Next, we calculate ρ 0 (0). Note that Q = ∅. For any Q ∈ Q and any ε > 0, we can find a finite set A ⊂ Ω satisfying Q(A) > 1 − ε. Thus, for any ε > 0, there exists an m ∈ M such that E Q [m] > 1 − ε. So that, (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 1 for any Q ∈ Q. Consequently, we have ρ 0 (0) = −1. 
Letting Q be an element of Q e with (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 0, we have, for
As a result, the condition in Lemma 3.14 is stronger than Condition 1 in Lemma 3.10 in general.
Example 3. 16 We consider the predictably convexity introduced in Example 2.9; and illustrate representations of Q, Q 0 and (ρ 0 ) * for predictably convex models. The following argument is based on Section 6 of [1] . Now, we assume that M defined in (2.2) is included in L; and define P (S) := {Q ∈ P | there exists increasing predictable process A such that
Note that this decomposition depends on Q. Now, we define A := {A ϑ |ϑ ∈ Θ S }. In addition, for two stochastic processes X and Y, we define an order as follows:
Remark that the ordered set (A, ) is directed upward (Lemma 6.4 of [1] ). An increasing predictable process A S is called an upper variation process of the ordered set (A, ) if A S satisfies the following two conditions: 1. We have Q = P (S) and
where A Q is an upper variation process for Q ∈ P (S).
Good deal valuations
In this section, we investigate thoroughly properties of GDVs. Since any good deal bound is given as a subinterval of the no-arbitrage pricing bound, when we represent the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound as functionals a and b respectively, we have
for any x ∈ L. Now, we define a functional ρ as ρ(−x) := a(x). It is then natural that ρ is a normalized convex risk measure as discussed in [2] . We call such a risk measure a GDV. Its precise definition is given as follows:
Definition 4.1 A convex risk measure ρ ∈ R is said to be a good deal valuation(GDV) if
Note that we consider only convex risk measures having the Fatou property as GDVs in this paper. Although the definition (4.1) is given from the seller's view point, we can rewrite (4.1) as
which means that any GDV describes the lower bound of a good deal bound. Indeed, denoting −ρ b (x) := b(x), ρ b satisfies (4.2). Furthermore, note that any GDV ρ satisfies −ρ(x) ≤ ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L since ρ(x) + ρ(−x) ≥ 2ρ(0) = 0 by the convexity. Then, for any GDV ρ, the interval [−ρ(x), ρ(−x)] provides a good deal bound. Note that the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound are mostly described by different GDVs. Now, we show equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV.
Theorem 4.2
2. ρ 0 is a GDV.
3. There exists a GDV. 
Thus, ρ * (Q) = ∞ for any Q ∈ P \Q. Supposing Q = ∅, ρ equals to −∞ identically by Theorem 2.12. This is a contradiction. In addition, we have 0 1. The third condition of Theorem 3.2 in [2] : "P(m > 0) < 1 for any m ∈ M" is sufficient, but not necessary for the existence of a GDV in our setting as seen in Example 3.15.
2. The fourth condition in [2] : "1 / ∈ M" is equivalent to condition 5 in Theorem 4.2 when M is a convex cone, whereas condition 5 is stronger than "1 / ∈ M" unless M is a cone.
Next, we enumerate equivalent conditions for a given ρ ∈ R to be a GDV.
Proposition 4.5 Let ρ ∈ R. The following are equivalent:
1. ρ is a GDV.
ρ(−m)
5. {ρ 0 ≤ 0} ⊂ {ρ ≤ 0}.
Proof.
1⇒2: For any m ∈ M, we have ρ(−m) ≤ ρ 0 (−m) ≤ 0 by (3.1). 2⇒3: This is from (4.3). 3⇒4: For any x ∈ L, we have
Moreover, the convexity of ρ yields that −ρ(−x) ≤ ρ(x) ≤ ρ 0 (x). 4⇒1: Note that Q = ∅ holds under condition 4. Thus, ρ 0 ≤ ρ 0 by Proposition 3.8. In addition, ρ 0 (0) ≥ 0 since ρ(0) = 0. So that, ρ 0 (0) = ρ 0 (0) = 0 because ρ 0 (0) ≤ 0. As a result, Lemma 3.10 ensures that ρ is a GDV.
3⇒5: Recall that Q = ∅ is ensured under condition 3. We have
5⇒2: Remark that we have ρ 0 (−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M. Thus, −m ∈ {ρ ≤ 0} for any m ∈ M. ✷
Relationship with risk indifference price
When M is a convex cone, ρ ∈ R is a GDV if and only if it is a risk indifference price, as shown in Theorem 3.4 of [2] . However, we cannot generalize this result to our setting. In this subsection, we investigate relationship between GDVs and risk indifference prices. We start with the definition of risk indifference prices.
Definition 4.6 For a given
In particular, when ρ is a convex risk measure, I(ρ) is said the risk indifference price induced by ρ; and is represented as
I(ρ)(−x)
describes the risk indifference seller's price for x induced by ρ as introduced in Xu [34] . Selling x for a price greater than I(ρ)(−x), the investor can find a suitable strategy from M so that the risk measured by ρ does not increase. For more details on I(ρ), see [2] , [22] and [34] . Now, we prepare a lemma as follows:
Lemma 4.7 Let ρ be a convex risk measure on L. If I(ρ) is (−∞, ∞]-valued, then we have inf m∈M ρ(m) ∈ R and that I(ρ) is a convex risk measure with
If I(ρ) ∈ R in addition, then Q = ∅ and
Proof.
We can see the lemma by the same way as the proof of Lemma 2.10 in [2] together with the above Lemma 3.1. ✷
We illustrate an example of a GDV which is not a risk indifference price; and two examples of GDVs which are risk indifference prices. 
The set of 0-attainable claims is given as
For a probability measure Q, we denote q := Q({ω 1 }), and identify Q with q. Thus, we regard [0, 1] as the set of all probability measures. We have
Next, we define
Since ρ(x) ≤ 0 whenever ρ 0 (x) ≤ 0, Proposition 4.5 implies that ρ is a GDV. Moreover, for x = − We consider an agent selling a claim x with price r ∈ R; and selecting m ∈ M as her strategy. Her shortfall risk is then defined as a weighted expectation of the shortfall of her final cashflow r + m − x with a loss function l. Note that l represents her attitude towards risk. Now, we assume that l is given as l(α) = Φ(0 ∧ α); and L = M Φ . For simplicity, we assume the continuity of l. To suppress the shortfall risk less than a certain level δ > 0 which she can endure, the least price she can accept is given as
As seen in Arai [1] , ρ l is a convex risk measure with the Fatou property under mild conditions. We define
As seen in Example 4.8, a GDV is not necessarily a risk indifference price. Accordingly, the following theorem gives sufficient conditions for a GDV to be a risk indifference price; and for a risk indifference price to be a GDV. 
ρ is a GDV.
Then 1⇒1 ′ ⇔2⇒3 holds. Moreover, when ρ * − (ρ 0 ) * is convex and M is given
As for the reverse inequality, we have, for any ε > 0,
By the arbitrariness of ε, we obtain (4.4). 2⇒1 ′ : Denote η(x) := inf{r ∈ R|r + x ∈ A}. Noting that η > −∞ by η ≥ ρ; and η(0) = 0 by 0 ∈ A, we obtain that η is a normalized convex risk measure by the conditions on A. Hence, it suffices to see Thus, ρ(x) ≤ r. On the other hand, for any r > ρ(x), there exists an m ∈ M such that r + m + x ∈ A, that is, η(m + x) ≤ r, which implies that inf m∈M η(m + x) ≤ r. As a result, we have (4.5). 2⇒3: As seen in the above, ρ = I(η) holds under condition 2. Then, Lemma 4.7 provides that ρ * = I(η) * = η * + (ρ 0 ) * . Since η * ≥ 0 by η(0) = 0, we have ρ * ≥ (ρ 0 ) * . Proposition 4.5 implies that ρ is a GDV.
As for the second assertion, it suffices to see the implication 3⇒1. De- 
since the minimax theorem (Theorem 3.1 of Simons [32] ) is applicable by the compactness of M 0 and the convexity of ρ * − (ρ 0 ) * . ✷ Remark 4.12 1. Theorem 3.4 in [2] asserts that, when M is a convex cone, the following are equivalent for ρ ∈ R: (a) ρ is a GDV; (b) there exists η ∈ R such that ρ = I(η); and (c) condition 2 in Theorem 4.11. Now, recall that inf m∈M η(m) = 0 automatically holds in the convex cone markets. That's because condition 1 in Theorem 4.11 is stronger than the above condition (b).
2. When M is a convex cone, ρ coincides with ρ; and inf m∈M ρ(m) = 0 holds. Thus, we do not need the minimax theorem to see the implication 3⇒1 in the convex cone case.
3. Madan and Cherny [25] developed a theory for bid and ask prices. They gave a framework of bid and ask prices which are expressed in a similar way with (4.4), employing the concept of acceptability indexes and acceptability levels.
Extension to conical market
Here we consider a conical market generated by the convex constrained market M. We define a convex cone set generated by M as
and regard it as the set of all 0-attainable claims in the extended market. Now, for a given ρ ∈ R, we denote
Note that ρ ′ is a convex risk measure on L with the Fatou property whenever Q 0 = ∅, and vice versa. In addition, ρ ′ ∈ R if and only if inf Q∈Q 0 ρ * (Q) = 0. We show the following proposition:
Proposition 4.13 For any GDV ρ (for the market M), if ρ ′ ∈ R, then ρ ′ is the largest GDV for the extended conical market M ′ smaller than ρ.
for any m ′ ∈ M ′ , which means that ρ ′ is a GDV for M ′ by Proposition 4.5. Now, ρ ′ is smaller than ρ, that is, ρ ′ (x) ≤ ρ(x) for any x ∈ L. Taking ρ 1 a GDV for M ′ smaller than ρ arbitrarily, we show ρ ′ ≥ ρ 1 . Denoting by ρ * 1 the penalty function of ρ 1 , we have ρ
by the cone property of M ′ . Hence, for any Q ∈ Q\Q 0 , we have
Consequently, we obtain
for any x ∈ L. ✷
Coherent good deal valuations
When M is a convex cone, ρ 0 is coherent, that is, there is a coherent GDV whenever a GDV exists. On the other hand, in our setting, since ρ 0 is not necessarily coherent, there might be no coherent GDV even if a GDV exists. Now, we illustrate an equivalent condition for the existence of a coherent GDV. Proof.
To see the reverse implication, let ρ be a coherent GDV. Since ρ is coherent, ρ * takes the values 0 and ∞ only. Defining Q := {Q ∈ Q|ρ * (Q) = 0}, we have that Q is nonempty and
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
In this section, we prove a Kreps-Yan type FTAP with convex constraints. Basically, the Kreps-Yan theorem ( [23] or Section 5 in [14] ) asserts, very roughly speaking, the equivalence between the existence of an equivalent martingale measure and the NFL: M ∩ L + = {0}. [2] proved, for the case where M is a convex cone, the equivalence among the NFL, Q 0 ∩ Q e = ∅ and the existence of a relevant GDV. Noting that Q and Q 0 coincide when M is a convex cone, and taking Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 3.14 into account, we naturally expect the equivalence between the NFL and either condition 1 or 1 ′ of the following theorem, whereas neither of them actually holds. On the other hand, the equivalence between the NFL and the existence of a relevant GDV still holds. The following is an FTAP for markets with convex constraints:
Theorem 5.1 As for the following conditions, we have 1 ′ ⇒4⇔3⇔2⇒1.
1. Q e = ∅ and inf Q∈Q e (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 0.
There exists a Q ∈ Q e with (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 0.
3. There exists a relevant GDV.
4. ρ 0 is a relevant GDV.
Proof. 2⇒1: For each δ ∈ (0, 1], we define a set B δ as
and
is a probability measure equivalent to P, since ∑ dP ∈ L Ψ . Moreover, noting that 2 −n ∈ B 2 −k for any k ≥ n, we have, for any n ∈ N,
which implies Q (n) ∈ Q e with (ρ 0 ) * ( Q (n) ) < 2 −n . As a result, we obtain inf Q∈Q e (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 0. 4⇒3: Obvious. 3⇒2: Let ρ be a relevant GDV. Since ρ(−z) > 0 for all z ∈ L + \{0} by the relevance, it suffices to see that ρ(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M. If there exists an m ∈ M with ρ(−m) > 0, then we can find a Q ∈ Q such that In order to complete Theorem 5.1, we illustrate counterexamples for the implications which are not shown.
Example 5.3 (Counterexample for 1⇒2)
Setting Ω = {ω k |k ∈ N} and P({ω k }) = 2 −k for each k ∈ N, we define random variables S k , k ∈ N as Next, we make sure of condition 1. To this end, we define for each n ∈ N,
We can see that each Q n is a probability measure equivalent to P; and
Thus, we obtain, for any n ∈ N,
from which condition 1 follows.
Example 5.4 (Counterexample for 4⇒1 ′ )
We take Ω = {ω k |k ∈ Z} and a probability measure P with P({ω k }) > 0 for each k ∈ Z. Further, we define random variables S k , k ∈ Z as
and M = co{S k |k ∈ Z} − L + . Now, we see that this model satisfies condition 4. We define, for each i ∈ Z and j ∈ N,
We can see that each Q i j is a probability measure with bounded density
We have then (ρ 0 ) * (Q i j ) = Here we give an equivalent condition to condition 1 ′ in Theorem 5.1.
Proposition 5.5
There exists a relevant coherent GDV if and only if Q e ∩ Q 0 is nonempty.
"if" part: This is shown by a similar way with Proposition 4.14. Taking a Q ∈ Q e ∩ Q 0 , we define ρ Q (x) := E Q [−x] for any x ∈ L. Then, ρ Q is a coherent GDV which is relevant.
"only if" part: This follows from the Halmos-Savage theorem (see e.g. Theorem 25 in [13] ). Now, we give just a sketch of proof.
Let ρ be a relevant coherent GDV. Denoting A := {x ∈ L|ρ(−x) ≤ 0}, we have sup x∈A E Q [x] = ρ * (Q) for any Q ∈ Q. Now, we consider B δ defined in (5.1). Since A ∩ B δ = ∅ for any δ ∈ (0, 1], the same separating argument as Proposition 2.13 implies that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a Q ∈ Q such that ρ
since A is σ(L, L Ψ )-closed. Now, for each δ ∈ (0, 1], we denote
Remark that Q δ is stable for countable unions. Then, we can find a Q δ ∈ Q δ satisfying P({ dQ δ dP > 0}) = max Q∈Q δ P({ dQ dP > 0}). In addition, we can see that P({ dQ δ dP > 0}) = 1 by contradiction. Since δ ∈ B δ , we have ρ * (Q δ ) < δ, from which ρ * (Q δ ) = 0 holds, since ρ * takes the values 0 and ∞ only. Hence, (ρ 0 ) * (Q δ ) = 0 by Proposition 4.5, that is, Q δ ∈ Q e ∩ Q 0 . ✷
An extension theorem
We assume that any x ∈ L is priced at ρ(−x), where ρ is a GDV. Then x − ρ(−x) is a 0-attainable claim. Now, we extend our market by adding all these claims to M. More precisely, the set of 0-attainable claims for the extended market is represented as
Remark that M ρ is a convex set including M. Since M ρ is closed in σ(L, L Ψ ) by Theorem 2.12, the NFL for the extended market is equivalent to M ρ ∩ L + = {0}, which is the no-arbitrage condition. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.6 Let ρ be a GDV. The following are equivalent:
1. ρ is relevant.
2. − ρ 0 (x − z) < ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L and z ∈ L + \{0}.
3. −ρ 0 (x − z) < ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L and z ∈ L + \{0}.
4. M ρ ∩ L + = {0}.
Proof.
The implications 2⇒3⇒1⇔4 are shown by the same way as Theorem 4.3 in [2] . Then we have only to see the implication 1⇒2. For any z ∈ L + \{0}, there exists Q z ∈ Q such that E Q z [z/2] > ρ * (Q z ) by the relevance of ρ. Thus, Proposition 4.5 implies that E Q z [z] > 2ρ * (Q z ) ≥ ρ * (Q z ) + (ρ 0 ) * (Q z ). Therefore, for any x ∈ L, we have
✷

Conclusions
We study properties of good deal bounds for incomplete markets with convex constraints. In Section 3, we study properties of superhedging cost ρ 0 and its largest minorant with the Fatou property ρ 0 . Next, we see that the existence of a GDV is equivalent to "Q = ∅ and inf Q∈Q (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 0" in Theorem 4.2; and enumerate equivalent conditions for a given ρ ∈ R to be a GDV in Proposition 4.5. Moreover, we introduce an example of a GDV which is not a risk indifference price; and look into relationship between GDVs and risk indifference prices. Furthermore, we prove an FTAP under convex constraints in Theorem 5.1. Among others, the equivalence between the NFL and the existence of a relevant GDV is proved. Moreover, we illustrate counterexamples to see that neither Q e ∩ Q 0 = ∅ nor inf Q∈Q e (ρ 0 ) * (Q) = 0 is equivalent to the NFL.
